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Abstract: This paper explores the debates around civil society and corporatism as ways of understanding changes in social association, including non-governmental organisations and protest groups, and information
management in relation to the development of the Internet. Both concepts have been used to examine the changes that have taken place since
the implementation of the Open Door Policy and more recently the
development of the Internet, and have shed light on the way in which
new forms of social association operate, and on their relationship to the
government. However, both concepts tend to be deterministic and reductionist positions. Instead, I use a centre-margin analysis based on
medium theory to explore the relationship between the state and society
as a way of shedding light on the interaction between the government
and NGOs and on how the state manages the flow of information in
order to shape public discourse.
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Introduction
The Internet and the development of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) have enabled the formation of associations of people around a
myriad of interests. At the end of 2006 there were an estimated 354,000
NGOs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) according to China’s
Ministry of Civil Affairs. However, according to Jia Xijin, an associate
professor at the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua
University, the real figure was likely more than one million (2007). Alternatively, corporatism and bureaucratic authoritarianism have been used
to analyse the way NGOs are managed by the state. The Internet has
enabled many groups to organise and to exchange ideas, and these developments are often pointed to as the beginnings of a civil society, a
prerequisite for democracy. This paper looks at the concepts of civil
society and the public sphere and the way that official and unofficial
discourses such as public debate are managed. It is my contention that
the concepts of civil society and the public sphere are inadequate for
understanding the way in which informational flows are managed as a
consequence of the development of the Internet. I will begin by looking
at the concept of civil society and its application to the opening of the
economy and the Internet in China. Alternatively I use a centre-margin
analysis, based on medium theory, to explore the power relationships
that are negotiated between the party and social organisations and provincial and local governments to argue that public discourse and informational flows are managed via the Internet. I also argue that the Internet serves as a window to the activities of provincial and local governments and as a window to public opinion. As a way of supporting my
claims I will then look at the way official discourses are managed through
NGOs, specifically those that concentrate on the environment and
HIV/ AIDS. I will confine my discussion to the overall management of
environmental and HIV/ AIDS NGOs. Because there are so many of
these groups, it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate them in
depth. I will then contrast the official discourses with the unofficial discourses in the context of the way a particular event was reported on (the
Huaxi/ Huankantao riots that occurred in response to pollution), and
the reporting on an HIV/ AIDS activist and her blog in the PRC.
The Internet has been effectively managed by the Chinese government through the development of content, legislation and the code used
to construct the architecture of the Internet commonly known as the
“Great Firewall”. By “architecture” I mean the technological means to
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build the Internet, including both the hardware and the software. Lawrence Lessig (2006) argues that “code is law” and by this he means the
way in which code is used to regulate behaviour. An example of code
being used to regulate access would be the use of passwords to access email or banking information. In China, where information has been subject to tight control and suppression, there is, I would argue, an emerging
understanding that information management and spin is more likely to
succeed than suppression. I aim to look at the way that the Internet (as it
is viewed in Mainland China) is shaped by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) and how resistance is articulated and silenced or incorporated into
existing discourses. More broadly, the Internet only empowers certain
groups within society because it suits the CCP. When an event occurs
that can be used by the party to advance a particular ideology, the Internet is allowed to empower society. When an event runs contrary to the
CCP line, such as the riots in Lhasa, Tibet, in 2008, there is a crackdown
and a public relations/ propaganda offensive follows. The CCP clearly
has clear control over the “social pool of information”. Though the
Internet has enabled Chinese citizens to participate in a new form of
public life, there is still no space in which dissent is allowed. As far as the
Internet is concerned, the CCP has sought to maintain its authority over
“what is known” through the development of content and through the
code used to construct the architecture of the Internet. Code is also used
to develop content.
The Internet acts as a tool of policy dissemination and a window
onto public opinion and social activism in a wide variety of forms. The
Internet is a point at which many competing interests can be observed,
by either the central government or researchers. My analysis is based on
medium theory; in particular I draw upon the work of Harold Innis
(1951, 1952, 1972), as this allows for a centre-margin approach to look at
the ways in which power relationships and policy implementation are
negotiated. Spatial relationships involve the negotiation and interplay
between central authorities and policy-makers in Beijing and provincial
governments as sites of policy implementation at the provincial margins.
A centre-margin approach also allows a structure for analysing the interplay between social actors such as NGOs and special interest groups that
arise in response to an issue or event. The case studies illustrate the ways
in which these relationships are negotiated. There is interplay between
official and unofficial discourses that can be observed via the Internet.
The Internet acts as a window onto all kinds of activity, official and un-
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official, and the way it is managed sheds light on the way politics vis-àvis social association and broader civic participation is managed. There is
a lot of negotiation between social and political actors in China.

Civil Society and the Public Sphere
The formation of NGOs and the networking capabilities of the Internet
in China are often given as evidence of the beginnings of a “civil society”
and an emerging public sphere, and both of these are seen as fundamental preconditions for democracy. The discourse in China on the concept
of civil society has led to a reinterpretation of Marxism by Chinese
scholars (Ma 2005: 22). Indeed, much of the scholarship concerning the
Internet in China uses theories of civil society as a framework – theories
influenced by Habermas’ notion of the public sphere and civil society
inside and outside of China (Tai 2006; Wu 2006; Yang 2003a, 2003b;
Zhou 2006). In general the arguments here are that the Internet is providing the means to transform China’s political culture from the bottom
up through the creation of a space in which groups can form and have
the potential to influence the government. It is in this sense that the
Internet is seen as a public sphere that is a democratising force. Wu uses
the notion of public sphere to explain the emergence of a non-official
ideology of nationalism that is articulated on the Internet in China. Guobin Yang argues that the Internet and civil society form a nexus of mutual benefit. He states that
the Internet facilitates civil society activities by offering new possibilities for citizen participation. Civil society facilitates the development
of the Internet by providing the necessary social basis – citizens and
citizen groups – for communication and interaction (Yang 2003a).

These notions of civil society and the public sphere are closely associated
with the work of Jürgen Habermas, who looked at the formation and
articulation of public opinion and debates in 18th-century Western
Europe. Habermas wrote that
by ‘the public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm of our social life in
which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access
is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into
being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to
form a public body (Habermas 1974).
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Habermas traced the materialisation, transformation and collapse of the
public sphere back to a highly commercialised mass media that reshaped
and confined political discussion to the media. According to Habermas,
public opinion was previously formed through face-to-face discussions
in coffee-houses over newspapers; now the articulation of public opinion
and discussion is confined to the media itself.
Definitions of civil society are much more hotly contested: Most
definitions de-emphasise power relationships that are embedded in the
potential formation of civil society groups in authoritarian countries,
where these groups are only allowed to exist with government sponsorship, legal or financial. A broad definition of civil society based on voluntary associations de-emphasises the political nature of the interactions
of these groups and fails to account for the inherent inequality in these
interactions. The definitions based on voluntary associations are too
broad, as these could include sporting clubs and groups outside the law
such as triads or gangs (Ehrenberg 1999: 235-236; Rodan 2003a: 506).
The problem with civil society is that it diffuses attention away from the
unequal power relationships inherent in all political interactions, regardless of whether these groups are actually able to influence the government. The concept of civil society is deterministic in its assumptions
about the ability of people to organise associations and the inevitability
of a form of pluralistic democracy in that it overlooks the restrictions
and regulations that are placed on the formation of associations, particularly in authoritarian countries such as China. The tracing of centremargin relationships provides a better framework for negotiations of
influence and power as it assumes that these contests are unequal from
the start and that they are under constant arbitration, resulting in wins
and losses on each side.
Yang Guobin (2003b) argues that the Internet has helped to establish the beginnings of a civil society in China and points to growth in
voluntary organisations that are beyond the reach of the government as
evidence of the emergence of a civil society. Many of these groups however are unable to register with the government, and that limits their
influence. To some degree the inability to register also has the potential
to impair mobilisation because unregistered groups can be made illegal at
any time and forced to cease their activities or move their operations
underground. Unregistered groups may lack legitimacy in the eyes of the
state – which marginalises them and their activities – even though these
groups only exist because the government has allowed it. The Falun
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Gong case and the ongoing campaigns to prevent their re-establishment
make it abundantly clear that if the government wishes to ban an organisation and remove it from the “public sphere”, it is quite capable of doing so. The degree to which unregistered groups are able to forge links
(guangxi ݇㋏) with the government is unclear, a fact which may prevent
an accurate evaluation of the effectiveness of these groups.
White, Howell and Shang, using a sociological approach, argue that
there is an emerging civil society in China, and they are cautious in the
way they use the term “civil society”, citing many of its limitations. Even
though there is a high degree of regulation among groups recognised by
the government, White et al. describe the situation as a “piebald civil
society” because there are groups that operate outside government regulation. The authors cite four types of groups: the caged, the incorporated,
the extra-government, and the suppressed. The caged include party organisations such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the
Communist Youth League and the All-China Women’s Federation. The
incorporated include NGOs and GONGOs (government-operated nongovernmental organisations) and finally the groups in limbo, outside of
government regulation. The groups outside of the government are those
groups lacking formal recognition and those groups that have obtained
official recognition through the patronage of an official agency or individual. White et al. write that
each of these categories of social organisation embodies, to varying
degrees, the characteristics of associational qualities of ‘civil society’.
This partial and piebald ‘civil society’ is made up of a complex and
rapidly changing social constellation with many layers and many different types of relationship between them and the state (White, Howell, and Shang 2003: 282).

White et al. also argues there are various layers to this process of incorporation and repression of different social organisations. Howell (2007)
argues that civil association in China had passed the point of no return:
She believes there are multiple civil societies and that the corporatist
model is insufficient as the number of social associations has spread and
is beyond the control of the party/ state, however she concedes that
there is repression of groups perceived as critical of the government.
What this spectrum and position overlook is the interaction between
different levels of the government itself in the form of local interests that
are interwoven with the opening of spaces of political discourse via social organisations. There is an assumption that the state in this process is
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monolithic and has homogeneous interests across the nation. Quite
clearly this is not the case. The Internet adds another layer of complexity
to the mix in that it acts as both a window onto the activities of social
groups and as a window onto the activities of provincial and local governments. In this sense, while it allows a new space of social interaction,
it also provides a site in which social interactions can be more closely
monitored. This is akin to the arguments made by Boyle (1997) about
the Internet as a remote and electronic panopticon.
In terms of using the Internet as the basis for a civil society, the
CCP has sought to manage the flow of information to prevent the formation of groups that would seriously challenge their role and political
authority. The argument I make here is similar to the one made by Rodan (2003b) in relation to Singapore, whose government has also been
very successful at preventing the formation of an effective opposition to
the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP). This, according to Rodan
(2003b), is the objective of media controls in Singapore. An example of
this would be the effectiveness of the shutting down and limiting access
to the Internet in Xinjiang following the Wulumuqi riots in July 2009.
Since 1978 groups in China have emerged and formed independently of the government, and to some degree they are autonomous.
However, the degree to which they are regulated by the CCP means that
they are managed and shaped to conform to the CCP’s monopolistic
knowledge and view. In addition, many registered NGOs cultivate state
relationships as a means of sustaining their operations. Ma writes that
ironically NGOs have tried to become more independent by holding
on to their relationships with the government […]. [They] often have
to rely on government’s authority to increase the size and influence of
their projects (Ma 2005: 97).

The problem with the application of the concept of civil society and the
public sphere is that it fails to adequately acknowledge the power relationships embedded within these institutional arrangements. This is not
to say that the way power in China is exercised by the CCP is totalising
and that there is no room for civic participation. Nor does it imply that
these groups are not the creation and visualisation of new spheres of
influence outside of the party. However, there are limits to what can be
said, and clearly the CCP still define those boundaries. The application of
civil society overstates the ability of these groups to potentially challenge
the government.
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In some ways the formation and regulation of NGOs is more consistent with development theories of state corporatism or corporatism
and bureaucratic authoritarianism. Ma (2005) argues that since the emergence of NGOs in the mid-1990s, the function of civil associations has
evolved along both civil society and state corporatist lines. This model
acknowledges the kinds of relationships that are shared by the state and
NGOs in China. In a corporatist system, the state usually channels the
interests of a group into a single organisation. Unger and Chan argue
that
the state determines which organizations will be recognized as legitimate and forms an unequal partnership of sorts with such organizations. The associations sometimes even get channelled into the policymaking processes and often help implement state policy on the government’s behalf (Unger and Chan 1995: 30).

The corporatist model is likened to the fascist states of the 1930s, where
business and labour interests were subordinate to the state. Japan, South
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan have all been described as corporatist in
earlier stages of their development.
The strategy outlined above by Rodan is much the same as in the
PRC, and this is not surprising as China has often looked to Singapore
for models of development and containment of informational flows on
the Internet. In terms of the development of civil society and the limits
of autonomy of civic association, it is the CCP that still defines the limits
of any public discourse and they alone remain the final arbiters of what
can and cannot be said. While the political process has opened up to
some degree, there are clear limits on expression. In order to remain in
the market, the hosts of websites, blogs, online games, Bulletin Board
Systems (BBSs), and chat rooms all conform to the boundaries set by the
CCP. In the case of voluntary and autonomous association this is still
largely dictated by the CCP. For example, there are no trade unions that
are independent of the government. The corporatist model better explains the CCP’s attempts to manage informational flows. Unger and
Chan write that
harmony is the catchword of a corporatist system, regardless of
whether this harmony is truly consensual or imposed from above.
And it is very often a goal-oriented harmony, orchestrated to serve a
national mission (Unger and Chan 1995: 32).
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Hu Jintao’s concept of “social harmony” echoes Unger and Chan’s sentiments, and the formation of NGOs and their function in Chinese society as defined by the CCP is to support “social harmony”.
The qualification that Ma (2005) makes in her argument about the
formation of civil associations and NGOs being consistent with both
civil society and corporatist lines allows for an account of CCP management and power relationships, as well as an acknowledgement of the
emerging influence and role that these groups play in Chinese society.
Ma writes:
The experience of Chinese associations indicates that the state has
generated mechanisms for adopting profound economic and social
structural changes in corporatist relations the state stills holds control.
At the same time, associations, bottom-up ones in particular, are raising their voices in the implementation and even in the making of policy; there are clear indications that civil society is evolving (Ma 2005:
137).

Ma’s fusing of civil society and corporatism is similar to Innis’s notions
of centre-margin relationships, and the negotiation of a monopoly of
knowledge and the management of time and space. Ma argues that this
approach provides a better explanation of the ways in which the CCP
has sought to manage and contain NGOs from the top down, while at
the same time she explains the impact and formation of NGOs from the
ground up.
The centre-margin approach I argue for is similar to the “fragmented authoritarian” approach advocated by Andrew Mertha. He argues that China has become more pluralistic in terms of policy formulation and implementation despite remaining an authoritarian state:
The ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (FA) framework, first proposed in
1988, has remained the most durable heuristic through which to study
Chinese politics. It asserts that policy made at the center becomes increasingly malleable to the parochial organizational and political goals
of various vertical agencies and spatial regions charged with enforcing
that policy. Outcomes are shaped by the incorporation of interests of
the implementation agencies into the policy itself. FA thus explains
the policy process as being governed by incremental change via bureaucratic bargaining (Mertha 2009: 996).

Mertha argues that the Chinese state is increasingly responsive to the
demands of society. He writes that
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the rules of the policy-making process are still captured by the fragmented authoritarianism framework, but that the process has become
increasingly pluralized: Barriers to entry have been lowered, at least
for certain actors (hitherto peripheral officials, non-governmental organizations and the media) (Mertha 2009: 995).

Small Government, Big Society
The government encouraged the formation of NGOs and Non-Profit
Organisations (NPOs) in reaction to some of the consequences of the
Open Door Policy and reforms that were begun in 1978 under the slogan “Small Government, Big Society”. Some reasons the NGOs were
promoted were to help fill the gap that was left in welfare services after
the iron rice bowl 1 was rolled back, and to help with response to disaster
relief. NGOs have also been useful to the government in the development of the economy. Ma says that
the government believes that the resources, development program
and services brought in or provided by the non-governmental sector,
domestic or international, will help the CCP restore its legitimacy, reduce public pressure on the government, and bring social stability (Ma
2005: 47).

At the same time, the CCP sought to manage NGOs through registration and regulation under the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Another role of
NGOs in China is to act as a conduit for discontent and for directing
complaints through official channels. In the case of environmental
groups, their function has been to steer victims of pollution through the
courts to prevent their rioting in the streets.
Twenty years after the launch of the Open Door Policy, China
sought to develop a legal structure to deal with social organisations
(SOs), and in 1998 the first regulations aimed at this sector were introduced (Ma 2005: 76). Ma argues that
the current state of Chinese NGOs is shaped by the present political
culture, the party-state’s continuing intervention in the private sector,
and the mixed influences of Western ideas and traditional Chinese
thoughts (Ma 2005: 77).
1

The iron rice bowl (tiefanwan 升哥ᅹ) refers to the work unit system of lifetime
employment that guaranteed housing and other benefits through employment in
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The reforming of the economy has effectively
ended this system.
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The official CCP NGO policy is one of “nourishment, development,
supervision, [and] regulation” (peiyu, fazhan, jiandu, guanli, 㚆,থሩ,ⲥⴷ,
ㅵ⧚) (Ma 2005: 69).
Good examples of how the government limits civic participation by
NGOs are the closures of the online journal China Development Brief and
the civil society journal Minjian (Popular) in November 2007. Minjian was
published under the sponsorship of the Social and Citizenship Development Research Center of Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. Minjian’s publication license was withdrawn by the news-publishing bureau
of the municipal government of Guangzhou in July 2007 (Radio Free Asia
2007).
The closures highlighted the precarious legal position of NGO publications. The journals had been operating without a publishing license
(kanhao ߞো), and this was the legal justification for the closure. However, thousands of NGOs run publications without licenses.
In China all licenses for publishing are held by sponsoring institutions, or zhuguan danwei (Џㅵऩԡ), that are responsible for ensuring
party propaganda discipline at publications under their watch (Bandurski 2007).

Minjian’s editor, Zhai Minglei, stated that
all of the internal organizational publications and materials of NGOs
in China are illegal publications […] [a]nd so it is with all of those
small booklets we circulate among friends and acquaintances in China
as a form of interaction or to seek the appreciation of friends, or
those various poetry collections we call people’s publications (⇥ߞ),
all reading materials shared among colleagues. All they need is to be
printed and they are illegal publications (Bandurski 2007).

Zhai turned to his blog after the magazine was closed; his home was
raided by the police and his hard drive confiscated.
In another incident in November 2007, a website aimed at providing information and contact assistance for those with Hepatitis B was
closed after six years of operation without any meddling from the government (Radio Free Asia 2007). The website was owned by an NGO,
and the closure followed the reclassification of the site as a healthcare
service provider. The site’s forums were removed after recommendations were made by the Ministry of Health (Radio Free Asia 2007). Again,
this illustrates the ability of the government to silence critics.
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Environmental NGOs
The state of China’s environment is one of the most serious problems
facing the country today, and the CCP widely promoted the Beijing
Olympics as the “green” Olympics. In 2006 Zhu Guangyao, Deputy
Chief of the State Environmental Protection Agency, put the cost of
environmental damage at 200 billion USD, 10 per cent of the country’s
GDP (China Daily 2006). The environment was also identified as a problem by Hu Jintao (2007a) in his report at the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 15, 2007. The damage to China’s environment is now seen as a serious threat to economic
growth as well as a consequence of that growth and development. In
1998 the government launched the “Three Green Project” to develop
what it called a “green market” to promote green consumption (Zhang
2007a). Pan Yue, Vice Minister of the State Environmental Protection
Administration, stated that “the ultimate force to solve China’s environmental problems lies in the public, or in another word, every ordinary
people [sic]. Chinese people are approaching the absolute green consumption step by step” in an article that promoted the use of NGOs in
solving China’s environmental crisis (Zhang 2007a).
A large number of NGOs have formed around the environment,
and in June 2007 the All-China Environment Federation claimed that
there were 2,770 environmental NGOs (Zhang 2007b). Despite the official numbers, most NGOs are underdeveloped and many more remain
unregistered. Given this I will briefly outline the ways in which the largest and most influential environmental NGOs are promoted and managed by the government.
The oldest and most influential environmental organisation is
Friends of Nature (FoN), the first NGO to register with the Ministry of
Civil Affairs, in 1994. Global Village Beijing (GVB) is another influential
environmental group, and both are located in Beijing. Both of these
groups run educational programs and are active in developing smaller
NGOs throughout the country. The leaders of FoN and GVB, Liang
Congjie and Liao Xiaoyi, respectively, were both appointed to the Beijing
Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG).
In 2005 the All-China Environment Federation was established and
promoted by the government. At the opening ceremony for the federation, China’s Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan said that he “encouraged the
federation to further study the major ecological problems and offer better consultation to government decision-makers” (People’s Daily 2005). In
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October 2006 China’s environmental NGOs were called upon by Zhu
Guangyao, the deputy head of the State Environmental Protection
Agency, “to play a bigger role in promoting supervising environment
protection” (Xinhua 2006).
Though there have been incidents when these groups have challenged the government, the close relationship these NGOs share with
the CCP is evident, and the promotion of these groups and official sanctioning of their positions is a way of channelling their influence and limiting or confining their activities. In doing so, the government has by
default effectively managed NGOs’ communication strategies and has
confined and shaped environmental discourse. In addition to this, the
registration process also acts as a filter because it is costly and timeconsuming; however, to avoid bureaucratic red tape and rigorous selection procedures, many NGOs turn to industrial and commercial administrative bureaus for registration because the process is easier and quicker
(Xin 2005).

Green Riots an Unofficial Discourse
The promotion of NGOs by the government in the media is generally of
the “good news” story variety. For instance, the State Environmental
Protection Administration (SEPA) website mainly covers good news
stories relating to China’s environment. The CCP showcased their ability
to clean up the environment as a part of the 2008 Olympics. In July
2007, the SEPA launched a two-month campaign to clean up the country’s rivers and recovered 725 million CNY (146 million USD) in fines
from polluting businesses (Reuters 2007). This clean-up effort is a stark
contrast to the numerous environmental riots and protests reported by
the international press. When these stories do appear in the Chinese
media, they are often reported very differently.
Small-scale, rural protests are common, and unless they are large
they do not make it into the national or international press. A report in
the New York Times in 2005 put the number of protests at 74,000 incidents, up from about 10,000 a decade earlier (French 2005). Environment-related riots, protests, and disputes in China increased by 30 per
cent in 2006 to more than 50,000 (Green Clippings 2006). As with many
stories on China in the international press, they are often initially generated by the Chinese media. Local press may cover an event which then
gets picked up by the international media – these stories are then re-
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articulated and re-circulated for a wider audience. This was also the case
with the Nandan mine disaster and the Jiangxi school explosion in 2001,
where the stories were first released by local press and then picked up by
foreign media. The Western press often cast these stories as David versus Goliath clashes, whereas the Chinese media often cast rioters as having been stirred up by a small group of troublemakers. An example of
this obfuscation occurred in April 2005 when it was estimated that thousands (the reports on the number of rioters vary from 20,000 to 60,000)
of residents of Huaxi, a town in Dongyang, rioted against police over
pollution from chemical plants in a nearby industrial park. The residents
of Huaxi and nearby Huankantao had been complaining about the pollution and how it affected their health and the productivity of their farms
for four years prior to the riots. The residents signed petitions and sent
them to the SEPA, and had sent delegations to the Zhejiang Provincial
Headquarters in Hangzhou and to Beijing prior to the riot (Cody 2005).
The local paper Dongyang Daily blamed local agitators for the riot (Yardley 2005). By way of contrast, the New York Times cast the protesters as
victims of pollution and official corruption (Yardley 2005).
The Phoenix Weekly, which is available on the Internet, and is a subsidiary of Phoenix TV in Hong Kong (legally received by ordinary
Mainlanders with access to cable or satellite television), ran extensive
coverage of the incident which has since been translated by Roland
Soong of the EastSouthWestNorth blog. According to the translation by
Soong, the Phoenix Weekly noted conflicting stories within the Mainland
media that also conflicted with the stories that their journalists were
picking up on the ground at the riots. Phoenix Weekly stated:
Although the mainland media were instructed not to report on the
matter, the incident was rapidly disseminated in Zhejiang. The people
called it a peasant rebellion, the Hong Kong media called it a ‘largescale riot’ but the local government said that ‘the removal of illegal
structures in Dongyang city was obstructed’ because ‘the desire of the
citizens for environmental protection was used by a small minority of
individuals with ulterior motives’ (Phoenix Weekly 2005).

Soong also claims that much of the coverage of the incident by foreign
journalists came from Chinese media reports and Internet sources. This
is due to the fact that journalists were not able to gain access to the area;
in fact, one foreign correspondent was briefly detained. Access to
Dongyang was blocked and checkpoints were set up at all of the major
entrances to the town, making it even more difficult to report on the
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riots. This tactic was also used after the Jiangxi school explosion. The
residents of Huaxi responded in the same way that the parents did at
Jiangxi – they turned to the Internet as a means of revealing the story to
a wider audience. According to Roland Soong, news of the event
was rapidly transmitted from the local chat rooms, but the local government immediately blocked the chat rooms and other channels. The
local media were also ordered not to report on this case. Yet, foreign
media and Hong Kong newspapers were able to report on this incident through the chat room information sources (Phoenix Weekly
2005).

The riots began on the night of 10 April and were discussed in Internet
forums up until 13 April, when this source of information and discussion
was shut down and posts deleted. 2 Despite this, Western news reports
claimed victory for the people of Huaxi/ Huankantou as six of the thirteen factories were ordered to shut down following the protests, though
nine residents were arrested (Cody 2005; Ramirez 2006).
In October 2005, six members of Green Watch were arrested by the
Public Security Bureau in Hangzhou. Green Watch is an environmental
group that formed after members monitored the riots in Huaxi. According to the NGO Human Rights in China, one of the members of Green
Watch, Lai Jinbiao, “was placed under criminal detention from April 12
until May 11 on the charge of ‘illegally providing intelligence overseas’”
(Human Rights in China 2005). It can be confidently hypothesised that
Lai was talking to foreign journalists who had converged on the area to
cover the story.
In 2007 I searched the Internet again for information on the riots
and what had happened in Huaxi, and I did not find much information.
What remains on the Internet – that is accessible outside of China – are
stories of the riots in 2005. Searches on official websites such as those of
the China Daily, Xinhua, and the People’s Daily result in “good news” stories about the prosperity of the town.
In terms of the management of official discourse, the CCP deletes
and blocks stories from the Internet that do not concur with their own
view of the event. This is a theme that has run throughout the case studies in this paper: When an event occurs, traditional informational flows
2

Roland Soong translated a number of posts from Chinese Internet forum comments (via Boxun). He cites this as an “example of citizen reporters taking over
when the mainstream media are missing in action” (Soong 2005).
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are circumvented and new flows are created through the Internet. Information about these events is managed according to CCP needs, so
stories are either eliminated or rewritten and used to benefit the CCP’s
image-building. Events that are seen as a challenge to the authority of the
CCP are contained and are systematically removed from Chinese cyberspace, as in the Jiangxi school explosion and the Huaxi/ Huankantao
riots. At other times, stories have been absorbed by the CCP and used to
push the party line. The result is that China has, to some extent, built a
separate Internet – an Internet with alternative histories and journalistic
accounts of events with material that is different in focus and content
from the broader World Wide Web. An example of this blatant absence
of history is that accounts of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre are
absent from this separate Chinese Internet.
The CCP has responded quickly to the changes in informational
flows as a consequence of the Internet. This adaptation to a changing
environment is consistent with Ronald Deibert’s extension of the ideas
of Innis in Deibert’s use of Darwin’s theories of evolution as applied to
changes in communications technology, and his application of medium
theory. Deibert argues that
a change in the mode of communication (environment) will ‘favour’
certain social forces and ideas (species) by means of functional bias
towards some and not others, just as natural environment determines
which species prosper by selecting for certain physical characteristics
(Deibert 1997: 30).

By social forces, Deibert means “actual social groups, actors, and various
forms of social organisation or normative or goal driven social behaviour” (1997: 32). My aim here is to extend this and to argue that survival
of a species in an evolutionary sense is about the adaptation of a species
to a changing environment. Just as some species are able to adapt and
change, some social groups are able to adapt and change. It is not so
much the environment that chooses which species or ideas survive and
flourish, but rather the ways in which a species or a group adapt to those
changes. In the case of China, as elsewhere, the government has adapted
to the changing communications environment. The CCP has been actively involved in shaping that environment through the strategies that
they employ to manage the Internet, which include the management of
code as a means of censorship, the construction of a legal framework,
and the development of content. In the end, the Internet is a tool that
both facilitates change and can be shaped and modified by those who
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use it. It is because of this that it is more important to look at what people
do with the technology rather than the technology itself.
The management of the Huaxi/ Huankantao riots also highlights
the negotiation of centre–margin relationships between Beijing at the
centre and officials in Zhejiang province at the margins, as well as centre-margin relationships in Zhejiang between Hangzhou, the provincial
capital, and the Dongyang officials at the margins. Goodman and Segal
argue that this negotiation of regionalism is a consequence of the Open
Door policy. Goodman and Segal (1994: 13) argue that “the centre lays
down the broad outline of a policy, with the provinces adopting specific
local measures for implementation”. In the case of the Huaxi/ Huankantao riots, the Internet provided a window through which the central
government was more able to closely observe what was going on at the
margins, thus reinforcing the authority of the centre. Traditional modes
of communication allowed provincial officials to cover up facts and paint
a picture of what Beijing “at the centre” wanted. For example, the famine that was a consequence of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s is
largely seen as a result of poor central planning and the policies of the
campaign. Food shortages were exacerbated by the boastful claims about
grain output that were exaggerated at every level of government in order
to paint a picture of success for the benefit of the central government
(see Wei and Tao 2005). This has also contributed to the perception that
official figures in China are notoriously unreliable.
As previously mentioned, the environment has been identified by
the government as one of the most serious issues facing the stability of
the country. In response to this impending crisis, there have been experiments with new forms of public participation so as to avoid riots like
those in Huaxi/ Huankantao. The Xiamen PX (paraxylene) plant in Fujian is a good example of this, and is being hailed as a victory for the
power of the people in the PRC (see Soong 2007). In 2007 construction
began on the plant, and by May, residents of the area were complaining
that it was already giving off an industrial odour. A mass protest was
organised via mobile phone text messages (see Figure 1). News of the
event spread across the Internet via social websites such as Twitter,
Flickr, and MySpace, and it also emerged as an issue on blogs and other
forums. Zoula, also known as the first citizen reporter, descended on
Xiamen to cover the story on his blog and website. As is often the case,
as the story grew, the local press stopped covering the story, however
coverage of the story was allowed to continue nationally. A columnist for
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the Southern Weekend, Lian Yue, wrote at length about the issue on his
blog. He also suggested that Xiamen residents start websites (Asia
Sentinal 2007).
Figure 1: SMS Danger Warning

Note:

The following translation comes from the China.org website run by the State Council: “The Taiwan-funded Xianglu Group has begun building a PX plant. It’s like an
atomic bomb in Xiamen”.

Source:

China.org 2008.

Many people will suffer leukaemia and more babies will be born with
congenital defects. A paraxylene project should be at least 100 kilometres from a major urban settlement, but we are only 16 km from the
project. For the sake of our future generations, please forward the
message to all your friends (China.org 2008).

The end of the message calls for people to protest on the streets on 1
June.
An estimated 8,000 to 10,000 people took to the streets on 1 June to
protest against the plant. The Xiamen press followed the familiar pattern
of blaming an individual or a small group of agitators for the unrest. An
editorial published in the Xiamen Daily claimed that the government and
most citizens had Xiamen’s best interests at heart. The editorial identified XiamenWave22 as a troublemaker who wrote an SMS that was stirring up trouble. The editorial said that XiamenWave22 was “misleading
the public and provoking hostility between the government and the
masses” (Asia Sentinal 2007).
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In an unusual twist, the project was stalled by the government on 7
June, a week after the street marches, when the government put a hold
on the project pending an environmental assessment and public consultation. This action was unprecedented and represented a form of experimentation with public participation. On 27 December there was an
announcement that the project would be moved and that the provincial
government would compensate the plant’s owners.
The new forms of experimentation with public participation follow
from the Seventeenth National Party Congress, during which Chinese
President Hu Jintao called for the expansion of socialist democracy. Hu
(2007b) argued China needed to
expand socialist democracy and better safeguard the people’s rights
and interests as well as social equity and justice. Citizens’ participation
in political affairs will expand in an orderly way. The rule of law will
be carried out more thoroughly as a fundamental principle, public
awareness of law will be further enhanced, and fresh progress will be
made in government administration based on the rule of law. Primary-level democracy will be improved. The government will markedly enhance its capability of providing basic public services (Hu
2007b).

The way the protests over the Xiamen PX plant were portrayed in the
media is a visualisation, via text and images in the media, of public opinion and of how centre-margin relationships are negotiated on the Internet. These groups do not necessarily speak to one another directly; they
do so via the media. In this instance, the CCP allowed the expression of
public opinion to drive the outcome of the project. If they had wanted
silence the protestors and forge ahead with the plans for the plant, they
would have done so, just like they did in Huaxi. If the authorities want to
close down chat rooms and BBSs, they can; if they want to delete blogs
and stop people posting, they can. If the CCP chooses not to block and
delete postings it is probably because they are showing an emerging understanding that “spin”-type management usually has more positive and
fewer negative consequences.

HIV/ AIDS
The unreliability of official figures in China on the number of HIV/
AIDS sufferers makes it difficult to get an accurate picture of the extent
of the problem. The first case was reported in 1985 and the disease has
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spread rapidly since that time. In 2005 a joint study by the Ministry of
Health, the World Health Organization and United Nations AIDS
(UNAIDS) put the number of people living with the virus at 650,000, of
whom 75,000 had developed full-blown AIDS (Wang Zhiyong 2007). In
2006 the number of infections reported was 183,733 and it was said this
was up 30 per cent from the previous year. In another report in 2007, the
number of people infected with the virus was put at 214,300 with 56,758
having full-blown AIDS (Wang Hongjiang 2007). An official report released prior to World AIDS Day on 1 December 2007 said that
China officially reported 223,501 HIV contracted cases, including
62,838 AIDS patients, by October 2007 while about 700,000 people
are estimated to be living with HIV/ AIDS (China Daily 2007a).

In the news reports that I researched for this paper there also seemed to
be a time lag in the figure-reporting. For instance, several of the official
CCP news stories from 2007 used figures from 2005. Despite the inaccuracies in the figures, the CCP has encouraged the development of NGOs
to address the epidemic.
The CCP’s rhetoric on the fight against HIV/ AIDS is as contradictory as its management of the environment and the Internet. On the one
hand, the government promotes the development of NGOs to help
tackle the epidemic, but at the same time the government attempts to
silence other groups when it comes to the issues of HIV/ AIDS. The
aim is to control debate within the confines of an official version of the
outbreak of HIV/ AIDS and its management. The official version includes the acknowledgement of the problem of HIV/ AIDS to some
degree, and through the use of the media and NGOs, the government is
trying to convey that the epidemic is being addressed and well managed.
NGOs are bounded by regulation and the need for government support
in order to exist and this in turn affects the way they operate.
As in the case of environmental NGOs, there are hundreds of
HIV/ AIDS NGOs and very few of them are recognised by the government; consequently, few are funded by the government. For example,
in 2007 the central government announced an alliance with certain HIV/
AIDS NGOs to assist in the fight against the disease. The Chinese Association of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS Prevention and Control will oversee the alliance as well as integrate and coordinate the participation of Chinese and international NGOs (China.org 2007a). This
new system is similar to the integration of environmental groups, and
centralises the management of NGOs.
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In the run up to World AIDS Day in 2007, the central government
launched a new campaign to combat the spread of the virus and to curb
the prejudice aimed at those who suffer from the disease. The campaign
included a series of television commercials featuring Jackie Chan. Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao both made public appearances
to promote AIDS awareness, which was consistent with Western PR
practices, i.e. the photo opportunity. Premier Wen has been making the
photo opportunity pilgrimage to Henan province every year since 2003.
During these trips, the premier visits orphanages and reiterates the central government’s position and policy on health care, which is the provision of free medicine and doctor’s consultations to people infected with
the virus, and free education for children orphaned by AIDS. Hu Jintao
also visited communities and doctors in northern Beijing as part of
World AIDS Day. Both Hu and Wen were using these visits to promote
awareness about the virus and to address the prejudice against those with
the virus (China Daily 2007a). These visits are tightly controlled by both
central and provincial authorities who hold their own “shows”: one for
the world, one for the central government, and one for the people.
As is often the case, there is a gap between central policy and regional implementation. According to the Washington Post, provincial hospitals fail to run the correct tests to reveal the virus, or they purposely
misdiagnose the virus in order to cover up the extent of the problem,
and this has been exacerbated by corruption (Fan 2007). Regional differences are also reflected in the different modes of transmission of the
virus. This is due in part to regional economic conditions and issues that
have arisen from the open-market economy. For instance, in central
China the main mode of infection has been through the collection and
transfusion of blood products. In coastal cities the virus has been spread
through prostitution, and in western China through prostitution and
intravenous drug use (Ma 2005: 133). Nationally, though, in 2005 unsafe
sex was cited as the main mode of transmission (China Daily 2007b). The
number of reported cases varies from region to region and this is reflected in the diverse attitudes to the management and prevention of the
disease in different provinces (Bezlova 2005).
One of the most tragic cases of mismanagement and corruption involved the medically acquired infection of thousands of rural peasants in
Henan, which also serves to illustrate the tensions in centre-margin relationships. In the 1990s, officials in Henan, one of the poorest provinces,
encouraged peasants to supplement their income through the sale of
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their blood. At the time, there was no screening for disease, and blood
was often collected in unhygienic conditions which led to the rapid
spread of the virus. In some cases this was exacerbated by attempts to
prevent anaemia through the practice of injecting regular donors with
unscreened red cells extracted from the valuable plasma (Human Rights
Watch 2006). In 2001 the scandal broke nationally and the central government responded by ordering the collection clinics to be phased out
and the screening and regulation of blood products be tightened. However, the practice continued and there are still occasional reports about
illegal blood clinics. In June 2007 a new campaign was launched in central China to crack down on the practice (China.org 2007b).
It is not clear how many people were infected as a result of this
practice; however, official figures from 2006 put the number at 35,232
reported HIV carriers, including 21,828 with AIDS (Human Rights
Watch 2006; China.org 2007c). The effect has been devastating and in
some instances has wiped out entire villages and left thousands of children orphaned and abandoned by their extended families and the
broader community (Human Rights Watch 2006). The situation in Henan is comparable to the hardest hit communities in Africa, and it is the
worst affected area in Asia (Beyrer and Csete 2003).
The mismanagement and corruption of blood collection practices is
not confined to Henan, and the pattern of neglect of AIDS victims along
with the denial of the problem are reflected in other parts of the country.
The epidemic is not seen as a national tragedy but an economic problem
and a major source of embarrassment for the government. This case B
highlights the negotiation of spatial relationships between Beijing at the
centre and provincial governments at the margins. Beyrer and Csete
argue that
China’s stalled responses to the outbreak, and its treatment of those
few courageous citizens who have exposed it, reflect the state of civil
society, rule of law, rights of citizens, and emerging center-periphery
dynamics of the new China (Beyrer and Csete 2003).

Government officials in Henan were actively involved in trying to cover
up the tragedy, and this is also a feature of the SARS outbreak. There
were also reports that courts in Henan had refused to hear compensation
cases of those infected. Human Rights Watch said that the “Health Minister Gao Qiang was quoted in the international press as saying that the
courts should admit those cases and make fair judgments” (Human
Rights Watch 2006). In another incident in 2006, the New York-based
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Human Rights Watch claimed that numerous sufferers of HIV/ AIDS in
Henan were placed under house arrest to stop them from petitioning the
National People’s Congress, in order to prevent them from seeking redress from the government after being infected by tainted blood products. Corruption also became a feature of centre-margin relationships
when local officials were arrested and others sacked for the theft of aid
from the central government and private donors in 2006.
The Henan provincial government has also gone to great lengths to
contain the activities of high-profile activists. Dr Yaojie Gao, an internationally acclaimed gynaecologist, first brought the scandal of Henan to
light after her lengthy investigation into the number of people presenting
to her with symptoms of the virus. Dr Gao used her own funds to treat
people with the virus and has often been threatened and harassed for her
work with victims of the virus. Her attempts to uncover the extent of the
crisis were thwarted by local officials who told her to stop what she was
doing. Furthermore, she was prevented from visiting villages. The campaign against her was stepped up when her children lost their jobs. When
Dr Gao tried to take her findings to Beijing, she was detained by authorities in Henan. Dr Gao was named a “Model Citizen” by the Ministry of
Education in Beijing in 1999 but was prevented from being able to pick
up the award by Henan authorities. In August 2002 she was interviewed
by China Newsweekly about her work, an interview which was reprinted in
other publications. Following the publication of the interview, Henan
provincial officials ordered her not to talk with journalists ever again
(Gao 2001). Her story and findings were eventually taken up by the international media when a Beijing-based journalist for the New York Times
covered her story and that of the victims of Henan (Beyrer and Csete
2003).
Dr Gao was awarded the Jonathan Mann Award for Health and
Human Rights by the Global Health Council in 2001, and the Ramon
Magsaysay Award for Public Service in 2003, but was denied the right to
travel to receive her awards. China Central Television designated her as
one of “Ten People Who Touched China in 2003”. There has been an
outcry from the international community over Dr Gao’s treatment, and
she was eventually given permission to travel to the United States in
2007 to receive an honour bestowed upon her by the Vital Voices
Global Partnership, a non-profit organisation. (Initially she was denied
permission to travel but this was later revoked.) As Beyrer and Csete
point out, it appears that under international pressure, Beijing ordered
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the Henan government to “ease its threats and harassment”. When asked
why the Chinese communist government did not want her to travel to
the United States to receive awards, she answered, “They’re afraid that I
will expose the fact that (illegal) blood-selling is the main reason for the
AIDS epidemic in China” (Sun and Tian 2007).
In a situation that seems to have changed direction, Peter Piot, Director of UNAIDS, went to China in July 2007 to meet with Dr Gao in
Henan and to visit families affected by the virus. Dr Gao was also visited
by Henan officials as part of a photo story for local papers during Chinese New Year celebrations, even though she was under house arrest
and was being prevented from travelling overseas (Yardley 2007). Dr
Gao and her story have been absorbed into the central government’s
version of the AIDS epidemic, and their attempts to use her for their
own propaganda confirm this. In July 2007 the government admitted
that illegal and unhygienic blood-collection practices in Henan are the
main cause of HIV/ AIDS in the province. However, they still cite other
reasons such as unprotected sex with foreigners and prostitution in other
provinces (China.org 2007c).
There are definite tensions between Beijing at the centre and Henan
at the margins, but the extent to which Beijing is in control or has a clear
stance on Dr Gao is unclear. Despite the apparent backing down, Dr
Gao was still effectively under house arrest until 2009 when she left
China for the USA, where she now lives in exile and will not return for
fears regarding her safety. However her blog remains; it is still hosted by
SINA (China’s largest portal) and was still accessible as of September
2010 – her last entry was made in 2009. The blog could easily be shut
down if Beijing wanted it that way, and the fact of the house arrest combined with the permission to keep blogging suggest a lack of consensus
between the provincial and the central governments on how to deal with
Gao and what she represents.
Other prominent HIV/ AIDS activists such as Hu Jia, Zeng Jinyan,
and Wan Yanhai have been treated in a similar way. Wan, the founder of
the grassroots organisation AiZhi (⠅ love and ⶹ knowledge), was arrested in August 2002 for posting “illegally acquired interior classified
documents of relevant state departments to overseas individuals [and/or]
media sources” on a website (China.org 2002). Wan was released after
confessing his crimes and after intense international pressure (Beyrer and
Csete 2003; Ma 2005). In an interview following his release, Wan said
that
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AIDS became an ideological weapon to attack Western culture. The
media didn’t talk much about AIDS in the 1980s—at least not AIDS
in China. There was no limit to talking about AIDS internationally,
but the media kept silent on AIDS domestically (Rosenberg 2003).

In one of China’s most famous cases, Zeng Jinyan and her husband Hu
Jia, environmental and AIDS activists, were detained by Chinese authorities in Beijing and spent 214 days under house arrest between August
2006 and March 2007 without any legal proceedings. Hu had been posting information on his website and blog about dissident and peasant
protests. Zeng told their story in a blog that detailed their surveillance by
secret police and her husband’s disappearance. Naturally her blog was
blocked but she continued to blog via email on a blog site outside of
China. This occurred despite her Internet connection being regularly cut
(Bristow 2007). In September 2007 the couple won the Sakharov Prize, a
human rights award given out by the European Parliament. In the same
year, Time also named Zeng one of the world’s 100 most influential people.
The couple have also turned their detention and surveillance into a
documentary called Prisoners of Freedom City, and when they attempted to
leave China in May 2007 to show the film overseas, they were detained
and placed under house arrest once again. The documentary is available
on YouTube outside of China.
On 27 December 2007 Hu Jia was arrested, and Zeng and their twomonth-old baby were placed under house arrest. The only visitors she
has been allowed are their parents. Hu’s lawyers have been prevented
from seeing him because his case is said to involve “state secrets”.
Threats have also been made to take the baby away in between feedings,
and friends and supporters of the couple have been prevented from
delivering baby formula to Zeng; some friends have even been taken in
for questioning, according to Radio Free Asia (Mudie and Chen 2008).
Bloggers have come out in support of Hu and Zeng and there is an
online petition calling for Hu’s immediate release. It is quite feasible that
Hu and references to him can be erased from the Internet using technological means. In the Western media, Hu’s arrest was tied to a preOlympics crackdown on dissident activities. Radio Free Asia also reported
that Dr Gao’s family has been threatened and harassed, that her e-mail
has been blocked, and that her phone has been tapped (Mudie and Chen
2008).
All three cases and the way they played out in the international media and on the Internet are also a visualisation, via text and images in the
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media, of the negotiation of centre-margin relationships between Beijing
and the international community. These cases also highlight the tensions
in those relationships and the contradictory nature of the way in which
the Internet and its impact on the management of information can be
viewed. A case can be made for either an emerging democracy or further
authoritarian oppression. The gaps and contradictions evident in some
of the case studies also allude to differences in the party at different
levels.

Conclusion
NGOs represent an official voice: As they have been sanctioned by the
CCP, they are regulated and registered. Then there is the unofficial voice
– this includes individuals who post videos of China’s pollution on YouTube for the world to see, and riots that are reported in the international
press. The rioters and the YouTube posters are often there in response
to an event or a crisis, as was evident in the cases of the mine disasters
and the SARS epidemic. They become events in a broader sense when
they hit the Internet and then become staged events when the government begins to mount their response. Even a riot, though spontaneous,
is a constructed event, albeit a chaotic one. A riot is still a form of protest. In addition, the way local officials handle these things has come
under increasing scrutiny from the central government in Beijing, and
the Huaxi/ Huankantao riots bear this out. The management and harassment of HIV/ AIDS activists has been played out on the international stage through the Internet to some extent, because to some degree
international relations are played out in the media through press statements, interviews, and events. In the end, though, what all of these case
studies reveal is that in order to understand the effect of the medium of
communication, we must look at the context in which people are using it
and how authorities manage that use. The ways in which authorities
manage information flows need further contextualisation in relation to
issues such as environmental degradation, the AIDS epidemic, and the
image China wishes to present to the world. In addition, the increasing
pressure from the international community over issues such as Beijing’s
involvement in Darfur and the handling of the situation in Tibet are also
having an impact on the way in which information is managed and public discourse is shaped in China.



Information Management and Social Association

237   

References
Asia Sentinel (2007), SMS Texts Energize a Chinese Protest, 1 June,
online: <www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&
task=view&id=520&Itemid=31> (1 July 2007).
Bandurski, David (2007), “Tolerance Evaporates”: Editors from Two Ill-fated
Journals Try in Vain to Reason with Chinese Authorities, 6 December,
online: <http://cmp.hku.hk/2007/12/06/766/> (12 December 2007).
Beyrer, Chris and Joanne Csete (2003), An Epidemic of Denial: Stalled
Responses to HIV/AIDS, in: Harvard International Review, 25, 2, 64.
Bezlova, Antoaneta (2005), Health: China Begins Waking Up To The
Specter Of HIV/AIDS, in: Global Information Network, Inter Press
Service.
Boyle, James (1997), Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and HardWired Censors, online: <www.law.duke.edu/boylesite/foucault.htm>
(28 May 2006).
Bristow, Michael (2007), Web Dissent on the Rise in China, in: BBC
News, 16 October, online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacif
ic/7045744.stm> (26 November 2007).
China Daily (2007a), Premier Wen Revisits AIDS-suffering Villages, 1
December, online: <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-12/01/
content_6292466_2.htm> (1 December 2007).
China Daily (2007b), Report: Unsafe Sex Major Cause of HIV Infection,
20 August, online: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08/
20/content_6566946.htm> (25 November 2007).
China Daily (2006), Pollution Costs Equal 10% of China’s GDP, 6 June,
online: <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/06/content_6093
50.htm> (19 November 2007).
China.org (2008), People Vs. Chemical Plant, 14 January, online: <www.
china.org.cn/english/environment/239503.htm> (24 January 2007).
China.org (2007a), NGO Alliance to Step Up Fight Against HIV/AIDS, 7
March, online: <www.china.org.cn/english/health/201894.htm> (25
October 2007).
China.org (2007b), New Campaign to Curb Illegal Blood Collection, 9 June,
online: <www.china.org.cn/english/health/213394.htm> (26 November 2007).
China.org (2007c), Illegal Blood Trade Main Cause of AIDS in Henan, 13
March, online: <www.china.org.cn/english/China/202834.htm> (26
November 2007).



238

Kay Hearn



China.org (2002), Anti-AIDS Leader Freed, 21 September, online: <www.
china.org.cn/english/2002/Sep/43727.htm> (26 November 2007).
Cody, Edward (2005), For Chinese, Peasant Revolt is Rare Victory
Farmers Beat Back Police in Battle over Pollution, in: Washington
Post Foreign Service, 13 June, online: <www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/12/AR2005061201531.html> (1 January 2007).
Deibert, Ronald J. (1997), Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication and World Order Transformation, New York: Columbia University
Press.
Ehrenberg, John (1999), Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea, New
York: New York University Press.
Fan, Maureen (2007), Provinces Undermine Beijing’s Goals on AIDS, in:
The Washington Post, 19 September, online: <www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/18/AR2007091802083.html>
(1 December 2007).
French, Howard W. (2005), Anger in China Rises over Threat to Environment, 19 July, in: The New York Times, online: <www.nytimes.
com/2005/07/19/international/asia/19china.html?_r=1&pagewant
...> (25 October 2007).
Gao, Yaojie (2001), My “AIDS Prevention Journey”, 1 May, online: <www.
rmaf.org.ph/madc/archive/files/gao-paper-aids-prevention-journey
_fbf9fb14fd.pdf> (26 November 2007).
Goodman, David S. and Gerald Segal (eds.) (1994), China Deconstructs:
Politics, Trade and Regionalism, London: Routledge.
Green Clippings (2006), Increase in Environmental Protests Causes Instability in
China, 6 September, online: <www.greenclippings.co.za/gc_main/
article.php?story=20060906170952367> (25 October 2007).
Habermas, Jürgen (1974), The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article,
in: New German Critique, 3, autum, 49-55.
Howell, Jude (2007), Civil Society in China: Chipping Away at the Edges,
in: Development, 50, 3, 17-23.
Hu, Jintao (2007a), Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all Respects, Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on Oct. 15, 2007, online:
<www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/25/content_6225977.htm>
(30 October 2007).



Information Management and Social Association

239   

Hu, Jintao (2007b), Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress, in: China
Daily, 25 October, online: <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/200710/25/content_6226673_4.htm> (25 October 2007).
Human Rights in China (2005), Environmental Activists Detained in Hangzhou, 25 October, online: <www.hrichina.org/public/contents/
press?revision_id=25771&item_id=25770> (15 November 2007).
Human Rights Watch (2006), China: House Arrests Stifle HIV/AIDS Petitions, 11 March, online: <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/
11/china12874.htm> (24 November 2007).
Innis, Harold A. (1972), Empire and Communication, Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Innis, Harold A. (1952), Changing Concepts of Time, Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Innis, Harold A. (1951), The Bias of Communication, Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Lessig, Lawrence (2006), Code Version 2.0, New York: Basic Books.
Ma, Qiusha (2005), Non-Governmental Organisations in Contemporary China:
Paving the Way to Civil Society?, New York: Routledge.
Mertha, Andrew (2009), “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”: Political
Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process, in: The China Quarterly,
200, December, 995-1012.
Mudie, Luisetta and Chen Ping (2008), Well-wishers Detained Outside
Hu Jia’s Beijing Home, in: Radio Free Asia, 23 January, online:
<www.rfa.org/english/china/2008/01/23/china_hujia/> (23 January 2007).
People’s Daily (2005), New NGO Founded to Rally all Chinese People
against Worsening Pollution, 24 April, online: <http://english.people
daily.com.cn/200504/24/eng20050424_182520.html> (25 July 2007).
Phoenix Weekly (2005), The Long Story About Huaxi/Huankantou, trans.
by Roland Soong, online: <http://zonaeuropa.com/20050601_1.
htm> (15 November 2007).
Radio Free Asia (2007), China Raids Bloggers Home, as Political Arrests
Double, 30 November, online: <www.rfa.org/english/china/china_
internet-20071130.html> (27 November 2007).
Ramirez, L. (2006), Pollution a Major Source of Discontent in China; Government Lacks Comprehensive Strategy, 8 May, online: <www.voanews.
com/english/news/a-13-2006-05-08-voa23.html> (19 November 2007).



240

Kay Hearn



Reuters (2007), China Targets 750 Firms in War on Pollution, 4 September, in: Environmental News Network, <www.enn.com/top_stories/
article/22635> (19 November 2007).
Rodan, Garry (2003a), Embracing Electronic Media But Suppressing
Civil Society: Authoritarian Consolidation in Singapore, in: The Pacific Review, 16, 4, 503-524.
Rodan, Garry (2003b), Special Issue On Electronic Media, Markets and
Civil Society in East and Southeast Asia: Introduction, in: The Pacific
Review, 16, 4, 455-464.
Rosenberg, Tina (2003), Seed Interview: Wan Yanhai, in: Seed Magazine,
January/ February, online: <http://seedmagazine.com/news/2006/
08/seed_interview_wan_yanhai.php> (15 July 2007).
Soong, Roland (2007), The Xiamen PX Project, 28 May, online: <www.
zonaeuropa.com/20070601_1.htm> (19 November 2007).
Soong, Roland (2005), Citizen Reporters On The Huankantou/ Huaxi Incident, online: <http://zonaeuropa.com/20050524_1.htm> (16 November 2007).
Sun, Can and Xiao Tian (2007), Gao Yaojie: A Doctor with Conscience,
March/April, online: <www.chinamemo.org/chinascope/magazine
/20070304/3> (26 November 2007).
Tai, Zixue (2006), The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society, New
York: Routledge.
Unger, Jonathan and Anita Chan (1995), China Corporatism and the
East Asia Model, in: The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 33, January, 29-53.
Wang, Hongjiang (2007), HIV/AIDS Cases on Rise in China, 8 September,
online: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-09/08/content_
6687991.htm> (23 November 2007).
Wang, Zhiyong (2007), Domestic Media Partnership Urged for AIDS Awareness, 22 August, online: <www.china.org.cn/english/health/221744.
htm> (23 November 2007).
Wei, Li and Dennis Yang Tao (2005), The Great Leap Forward: Anatomy of a Central Planning Disaster, in: Journal of Political Economy,
113, 4, 840.
White, Gordon, Jude Howell, and Xiaoyuan Shang (2003), Market Reforms and the Emergent Constellation of Civil Society in China, in:
Carolyn M. Elliot (ed.), Civil Society and Democracy: A Reader, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 265-304.



Information Management and Social Association

241   

Wu, Xu (2006), Chinese Cyber Nationalism: Evolution, Characteristics, and
Implications, Plymouth: Lexington Books.
Xin, Qiu (2005), China Curbs Civil Society Groups, in: Asia Times, 19
April, online: <www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GD19Ad07.html>
(23 October 2007).
Xinhua (2006), Chinese Environmental NGOs Called on to Play a Bigger
Role, 30 October, online: <www.china.org.cn/english/environment
/186754.htm> (24 October 2007).
Yang, Guobin (2003a), The Co-Evolution of the Internet and Civil Society in China, in: Asian Survey, 43, 3, 405-422.
Yang, Guobin (2003b), The Internet and Civil Society in China: A Preliminary Assessment, in: Journal of Contemporary China, 12, 36, 453475.
Yardley, Jim (2007), China Covers Up Detention of AIDS Doctor, in:
The New York Times, online: <www.nytimes.com/2007/02/16/
world/asia/16china.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin>
(24 October 2007).
Yardley, Jim (2005), Rural Chinese Riot as Police Try to Halt Pollution
Protest, in: The New York Times, 14 April, online: <www.nytimes.
com/2005/04/14/international/asia/14riot.html> (1 November 2007).
Zhang, Tingting (2007a), Environmental NGOs Encouraging Green Actions, 5
November, online: <www.china.org.cn/english/environment/2308
61.htm> (9 November 2007).
Zhang, Tingting (2007b), Grassroots NGOs Struggle for Legitimacy, 22 June,
online: <www.china.org.cn/english/environment/214835.htm> (24
October 2007).
Zhou, Yongming (2006), Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet
and Political Participation in China, Standford: Standford University
Press.



Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 3/2010: 1-2



Contents
Introduction


Ming-sho Ho
Understanding the Trajectory of Social Movements in
Taiwan (1980-2010)

3

Research Articles








Anru Lee and Wen-hui Anna Tang
The Twenty-five Maiden Ladies’ Tomb and Predicaments of
the Feminist Movement in Taiwan
James W. Y. Wang
The Political Economy of Collective Labour Legislation in
Taiwan
I-lun Tsai and Ming-sho Ho
An Institutionalist Explanation of the Evolution of Taiwan’s
Disability Movement: From the Charity Model to the Social
Model
Chin-shou Wang
The Movement Strategy in Taiwan’s Judicial Independence
Reform

23

51

87

125

Discussion


Stephen Philion
The Impact of Social Movements on Taiwan’s Democracy

149

Research Articles


Dong Wang
China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective

165



2

Contents   

Research Articles


Kay Hearn
Official/ Unofficial: Information Management and
Social Association

Contributors

211
243

